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THE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE SUBPART F SYSTEM OF 
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: HOW THE SCHERING-
PLOUGH DECISION INDICATES THAT THE STATUS QUO IS 
UNCLEAR AND UNWISE 
ABSTRACT 
Complicated subpart F rules govern the taxation of transactions between a 
U.S. parent company and its foreign subsidiaries.  The difficulty with 
interpreting the subpart F rules and applying them to complex derivative 
transactions has been the subject of extensive tax literature.  Few of the 
proposed solutions have been simple enough to implement quickly and 
efficiently without wholesale changes to the subpart F system.  This Comment 
focuses on the inconsistent tax treatment of economically equivalent 
transactions that currently exists under subpart F and the incentives that this 
system creates for U.S. companies to engage in expensive tax-planning 
strategies to avoid subpart F taxation.  These tax-planning strategies—used to 
achieve an economically identical result—cost both the government and U.S. 
companies unnecessary money. 
This Comment uses the Schering-Plough Corp. v. United States decision to 
highlight the difficulties in properly complying with subpart F and the lengths 
to which a taxpayer must go to avoid subpart F.  It explores the reasons why 
the subpart F system was created the way that it was, as well as the competing 
theories on international taxation that led to the subpart F system.  This 
Comment then proposes that economically equivalent transactions should be 
taxed the same, either by using the transfer pricing rules—currently used to 
govern asset sales between a parent and its foreign subsidiary—more 
extensively in governing cash loans and loans of property between a parent 
and its foreign subsidiary, or alternatively, by treating asset sales between a 
foreign subsidiary and its domestic parent as a repatriating event—the same 
way that a loan between a foreign subsidiary and its domestic parent is 
currently treated—and taxing the entire transaction under subpart F.  Either 
option would give greater consistency to transactions governed by subpart F 
and would be relatively simple to implement within the political process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Permitting a taxpayer to control the economic destiny of a 
transaction with labels would . . . exalt form over substance, thereby 
perverting the intention of the tax code.1 
Currently, under subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code,2 most forms of 
income earned by a foreign subsidiary of a domestic company3 are not taxed 
until the income is repatriated4 to the United States.  Once the income is 
repatriated to the domestic parent, the amount of money that has been earned 
abroad is then usually subject to subpart F taxation.  Subpart F provides 
detailed rules and regulations describing when income earned by a foreign 
subsidiary is subject to U.S. taxation.5 
In 1991, the multinational drug corporation Schering-Plough was faced 
with a “ballooning” balance sheet as its cash reserves and debt were rising to 
high levels.6  Schering-Plough’s cash was tied up in its foreign Irish and Swiss 
subsidiaries, while its domestic parent accumulated the debt.7  Schering-Plough 
wanted to get the cash from its foreign subsidiaries to pay down its domestic 
debt and slow the ballooning of its balance sheet, but also wanted to avoid the 
significant subpart F taxation that would accompany the simple transfer of 
these funds from foreign subsidiary to parent.8 
In an effort to avoid subpart F taxation while still getting lump sum 
payments from its subsidiaries, Schering-Plough enlisted the help of Merrill 
Lynch to design a transfer method with the sole goal of deferring taxation.9  
The transfer method consisted of two waves of contracts, the first in 1991 and 
the second in 1992.10  Each wave was essentially the same: notional principal 
contracts11 based on a large amount of money that would provide Schering-
 
 1 Schering-Plough Corp. v. United States, 651 F. Supp. 2d 219, 242 (D.N.J. 2009). 
 2 I.R.C. §§ 951–965 (2006). 
 3 This income is generally referred to as active income.  See, e.g., Stephen E. Shay, Exploring 
Alternatives to Subpart F, TAXES, Mar. 2004, at 29, 30. 
 4 Repatriation is the transfer of income earned in a foreign country back into the home country, which 
for the purposes of this Comment will be the United States. 
 5 See generally I.R.C. §§ 951–965. 
 6 Schering-Plough Corp., 651 F. Supp. 2d at 226. 
 7 Id. at 225–26. 
 8 Id. at 227–28. 
 9 Id. at 226.  Schering-Plough paid Merrill Lynch $2.2 million for its services in connection with the 
1991 swap and $2 million for its work on the 1992 swap.  Id. at 230–32. 
 10 Id. at 229–32. 
 11 See infra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
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Plough with a right to receive a stream of income over twenty years.12  
Schering-Plough then sold this interest in income to one of its subsidiaries.13  
That way, Schering-Plough hoped to amortize the lump sum from the 
subsidiary over the lifetime of the contract, rather than paying taxes on the 
lump sum all at once.14 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) challenged this arrangement, claiming 
that the transactions were actually loans between Schering-Plough and its 
foreign subsidiaries.15  The U.S. District Court of New Jersey agreed with the 
IRS and held that the transactions were loans, which subjected Schering-
Plough to a $473 million tax liability.16  The court’s analysis in recategorizing 
the notional principal contracts as loans was extremely complex and detailed, 
and it is unclear which factors the court used to determine whether the 
transaction was a loan.  The court’s analysis highlights the difficulties that 
exist with the current subpart F system, and the loopholes and tax-planning 
strategies available as a result of these rules.17 
To fully appreciate the issues in Schering-Plough, an analysis of the two 
competing theories on international taxation, Capital Import Neutrality (CIN) 
and Capital Export Neutrality (CEN), is necessary.  CIN is an international tax 
system predicated on the assumption that all businesses in the same country 
should be taxed at the same rate.18  If all countries had identical rates of 
taxation for income earned within their borders, then CIN would be achieved.19  
On the other hand, CEN is achieved when a country taxes only its residents on 
their worldwide income.20  Moving toward a system of CEN lessens the 
problem of categorizing a specific asset for tax purposes because wherever a 
taxpayer chooses to do business, it would be taxed at the same rate.21  CEN 
would eliminate the role that taxes play on where an investor does business and 
would make efficiency the driving force behind investment.22 
 
 12 Schering-Plough Corp., 651 F. Supp. 2d at 222. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. at 234. 
 16 Id. at 221, 272. 
 17 See infra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 20 Tsilly Dagan, National Interests in the International Tax Game, 18 VA. TAX REV. 363, 367 (1998). 
 21 See infra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra note 121 and accompanying text. 
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Additionally, to repair the difficulties with subpart F it is important that 
transactions between a domestic parent and a foreign subsidiary should be 
treated consistently.  There is no reason that the sale of an asset between a 
parent and its subsidiary should not trigger subpart F income while a loan 
between the two does.  Consistent treatment of these transactions can be 
achieved by using the transfer pricing rules that currently regulate asset sales 
between a parent and subsidiary to also regulate loans.  Alternatively, if 
transfer pricing rules are deemed ineffective then asset sales between a 
subsidiary and parent should be deemed repatriating events under subpart F in 
the same way that loans are currently treated.  This Comment does not endorse 
which of these two solutions would be more effective but advocates that 
treating economically identical transactions consistently is imperative, and that 
one of the two solutions must be adopted to ensure consistent treatment. 
Part I of this Comment examines the details and rationale of the Schering-
Plough decision.  Part II tracks the development of the subpart F system, and 
describes the details of the subpart F system as it exists today and the various 
forms of income that are covered under subpart F.  Part III explores the 
competing theories of international taxation and the arguments that proponents 
of each system use to advocate their positions.  Part IV examines the problems 
and inconsistencies in the current subpart F system and several academics’ 
suggestions on how to better the system. 
Part V uses the Schering-Plough case to illustrate how arbitrary some of the 
distinctions in subpart F are and discusses how moving toward an international 
tax theory of CEN would lead to more efficient investment decisions.  Part VI 
proposes that the taxation of cash loans from a foreign subsidiary to its 
domestic parent should be consistent with the taxation of asset sales and 
property loans between the two.  It suggests that one of two alternate theories 
should be adopted, which will lead to consistent tax treatment of economically 
identical transactions. 
I. THE SCHERING-PLOUGH CASE 
In 1991, Schering-Plough entered into a notional principal contract with the 
Dutch bank ABN, in which $650 million was the principal amount that the 
parties used to make payments to each other based upon different interest 
rates.23  A notional principal contract is a transaction in which periodic 
 
 23 Schering-Plough Corp. v. United States, 651 F. Supp. 2d 219, 228–29 (D.N.J. 2009). 
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payments are made with respect to a notional amount which itself never 
actually changes hands.24  Typically, the periodic transfer payments are based 
on different interest rates, and the only cash that exchanges hands is the net 
payment of the difference between the two interest rates.25 
The contract worked in the following way: Schering-Plough agreed to 
make payments every six months to ABN based on the London Interbank 
Offered Rate (LIBOR), and ABN agreed to pay Schering-Plough every six 
months based on the federal funds rate.26  After netting these payments, it 
becomes apparent that the only payment actually made was the net difference 
between the two rates.27  ABN then entered into a mirror swap with Merrill 
Lynch, which was based on the same $650 million notional principal amount, 
but in this transaction ABN made payments based on the LIBOR rate and 
Merrill made payments to ABN based on the federal funds rate.28 
Following these transactions, in 1991, Schering-Plough sold its right to 
receive income from years six through twenty on the notional principal 
contract to its foreign subsidiary, Scherico, for $202.4 million.29  Once 
Schering-Plough assigned its right to receive income, the biyearly payments to 
ABN were no longer netted.30  Thus, Schering-Plough was obligated to make 
full payments to ABN, and ABN to Scherico.31  In 1992, Schering-Plough 
entered into almost the same notional principal contract with ABN, but this 
time with a notional principal amount of $950 million.32  It again assigned the 
right to receive income from years six through twenty on the contract to 
 
 24 Alvin C. Warren, Jr., US Income Taxation of New Financial Products, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 899, 905 
(2004). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Schering-Plough Corp., 651 F. Supp. 2d at 231. 
 27 See id. 
 28 Id. at 229.  The length of the agreement was for the same term as the original agreement, and payments 
were to be made on the same payment dates.  Id.  The purpose of ABN entering into the mirror transaction was 
to insulate itself from any volatility in the interest rates.  Id. at 230.  The benefit that ABN received from this 
entire transaction was ten basis points (one-tenth of one percent of the overall transaction) of yearly 
compensation from Merrill Lynch.  Id. at 229. 
 29 Id. at 230.  The court considered the $202.4 million amount a fair value because Schering-Plough 
initially assigned its right to receive income on $60 million of the notional principal amount to Banco di Roma, 
to establish an arms-length pricing agreement that it would later use in its assignment to Scherico.  Id.  The 
bank paid Schering-Plough $26.4 million for the assignment.  Id.  In the 1991 swap, Schering-Plough also 
assigned its right to receive income on $100 million of the notional principal amount to another subsidiary for 
an additional $44 million lump sum payment.  Id. 
 30 Id. at 229. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 231.  There was still an initial agreement to net payments, and ABN entered into the same mirror 
transaction with Merrill Lynch as it did in the 1991 transaction.  Id. 
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Scherico, but this time, because the notional amount was larger, the lump sum 
payment Schering-Plough received was $444 million.33 
By entering into these notional principal contracts with ABN, Schering-
Plough solved the problem of its ballooning balance sheet by receiving large 
lump sum cash payments from its foreign subsidiaries, which it could use to 
pay off debt, thereby reducing the accumulating cash and debt that was on its 
balance sheet.  By assigning the right to receive income to its foreign 
subsidiaries, Schering-Plough believed it would able to amortize the taxes on 
the transactions over the life of the notional principal contract and thus not pay 
subpart F taxes on the lump sum payments it received.34  Instead of paying tax 
on the entire $690.4 million lump sum in one year, Schering-Plough hoped to 
pay a portion of the tax each year over the life of the contract.35 
Schering-Plough relied on the authority of IRS Notice 89-21, issued on 
February 7, 1989, to come to the conclusion that it was justified in sidestepping 
subpart F taxation.36  The Notice provides guidance concerning income tax 
treatment of lump sum payments received in connection with notional 
principal contracts.37  It announces that “lump-sum payments . . . with respect 
to notional principal contracts . . . [that require future payments must be] taken 
into account over the life of the contract . . . .”38  Thus, under this Notice, 
Schering-Plough believed that it would be able to amortize the income it 
received over the life of the notional principal contract and defer significant tax 
liability.39  Notice 89-21, however, also states that “[n]o inference should be 
drawn . . . as to the proper treatment of transactions that are not properly 
characterized as notional principal contracts, for 
instance, . . . transactions . . . [that] are in substance . . . loans.”40 
The district court ruled that Schering-Plough’s transactions were entered 
into exclusively for tax purposes and thus were in substance loans, even though 
in form, the transactions were the sale of future income as part of a notional 
 
 33 Id. at 232.  For the 1992 swap, Schering-Plough entered into the same type of arms-length pricing 
agreement as it had in the 1991 swap, but this time with Rabobank Nederland.  Id. at 231.  The assignment was 
based on $25 million of the notional amount, and Schering-Plough was paid $12 million.  Id. 
 34 Complaint at 2–4, Schering-Plough Corp. v. United States, 651 F. Supp. 2d 219 (D.N.J. 2009) (No. 05-
2575), 2005 WL 1474762. 
 35 Id. at 3. 
 36 I.R.S. Notice 89-21, 1989-1 C.B. 651. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 652. 
 39 Complaint, supra note 34, at 2. 
 40 I.R.S. Notice 89-21, 1989-1 C.B. 651, 652. 
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principal contract.41  The court focused on the subjective intent of Schering-
Plough to structure these transactions simply to avoid taxes, and the court 
concluded that Schering-Plough was taking out a loan from its subsidiaries.42  
The court’s speculation that these transactions were entered into exclusively to 
avoid subpart F taxation was further fueled by the fact that Schering-Plough 
determined the amount of money it needed and then worked backwards to find 
the proper notional amount that would produce the desired lump sum payments 
from Scherico.43 
When a court finds that a certain type of transaction creates a tax result that 
is inconsistent with the form of the transaction, it has the authority to reclassify 
the transaction in accordance with its substance.44  This is known as the 
substance-over-form doctrine.45  In Schering-Plough Corp., the court 
employed stricter scrutiny to analyze the substance of the swaps because 
Schering-Plough and its subsidiaries were related parties.46  The court 
articulated that to analyze the economic substance of the transaction the 
“determinative fact is the intention as it existed at the time of the 
transaction,”47 and relied on evidence that Schering-Plough officials 
considered the transactions as though they were loans and that ABN was paid 
for its participation in the transaction.48  Additionally, the court focused on the 
fact that ABN had no significant risk in these swap transactions and that the 
probability of Schering-Plough defaulting on payment was almost zero.49 
The court rejected Schering-Plough’s substantive argument that the 
company had precisely followed Notice 89-21, which specifically governs 
notional principal contracts in which a lump sum is paid for the right to receive 
 
 41 The court agreed with the government’s contention that these transactions were in actuality loans, with 
the lump sum payments by Scherico to Schering-Plough representing the principal loaned and assignment of 
future income streams representing the repayment of the principal plus interest.  Schering-Plough Corp. v. 
United States, 651 F. Supp. 2d 219, 272 (D.N.J. 2009). 
 42 Id.  The court focused on the objective test of the economic realities of this transaction and relied on 
the substance-over-form doctrine to classify these transactions as loans.  Id. at 223. 
 43 The court determined that there was no other practical reason for Schering-Plough to enter into these 
transactions other than to avoid taxes.  Id. at 266–70. 
 44 See id. at 243. 
 45 Id. 
 46 See id. at 246. 
 47 Id. (quoting Saigh v. Comm’r, 36 T.C. 395, 420 (1961)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 48 Id. at 262. 
 49 Id. at 264. 
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future payments.50  Schering-Plough argued that a change the IRS made to 
Notice 89-21 in 1993 provided further proof that the taxes should be 
amortized.51  In 1993, regulations were adopted which treated lump sum 
payments from notional principal contracts as loans, making them taxable in 
the year received.52  These regulations were changed only for transactions 
“entered into on or after December 13, 1993”53 and should not have applied to 
either the 1991 or 1992 Schering-Plough transactions.54  Schering-Plough also 
argued that it was denied consistent treatment with other similarly situated 
taxpayers who were afforded the benefit of Notice 89-21.55 
Congress has set up detailed rules about how repatriated income should be 
taxed, and the IRS supplemented those rules with Notice 89-21.  Schering-
Plough followed Notice 89-21, which was applied to other similarly situated 
taxpayers who entered into this type of transaction before 1993, so why did it 
lose the case?  The answer is the court’s conclusion, after a detailed analysis 
regarding each aspect of the transactions, that the substance-over-form doctrine 
applied. 
However, taxpayers routinely structure transactions that may offer a variety 
of benefits; the point at which one transaction becomes a different one is 
extremely difficult to determine.56  If courts draw a line at this case, then under 
what circumstance is Notice 89-21 a useful or relevant tool, and why did the 
IRS issue this ruling?  To begin to answer these questions, a more detailed 
analysis of the history and difficulties with the subpart F international taxation 
regime is required. 
 
 50 Id. at 272.  Schering-Plough argued that it should have been able to rely on Notice 89-21 because it 
was an “administrative pronouncement on which taxpayers could rely.”  Complaint, supra note 34, at 2 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 51 Schering-Plough Corp., 651 F. Supp. 2d at 236. 
 52 See id. 
 53 Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(j) (1994). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Lee A. Sheppard, Looking Through Derivatives to Find Substance, TAX ANALYSTS, Dec. 14, 2009, at 
1141.  The IRS issued a Field Service Advice Memoranda (FSA) to a competitor of Schering-Plough in 1997, 
which declared that the same type of assignment of future income streams in exchange for a lump sum 
payment on a notional principal contract was governed by Notice 89-21, even though the assignment could be 
properly characterized as a loan.  Id. at 1144.  The IRS advised the taxpayer that the lump sum payment should 
be amortized.  I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. TL-N-3454-94 (Aug. 29, 1997).  Although an FSA does not have 
precedential value and cannot be relied on by taxpayers, it does prove that taxpayers similarly situated to 
Schering-Plough were given the benefit of Notice 89-21. 
 56 See generally Warren, supra note 11 (discussing the difficulty with characterizing certain derivative 
transactions). 
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II. THE HISTORY AND ENACTMENT OF SUBPART F 
Between 1913 and 1950, U.S. corporations were not taxed on the income of 
their foreign subsidiaries until the income was repatriated to the United 
States.57  This system created a strong incentive for U.S. corporations to shift 
operations, especially income-generating activities, to foreign countries with 
low tax rates, thereby gaining the benefit of tax deferral on the foreign-earned 
income.58  Section A of this Part examines the reasons why it was necessary to 
enact subpart F legislation.  Section B then explains the detailed provisions of 
subpart F and how they functionally operate. 
A. How Subpart F Became the Law 
Prior to subpart F, the most common technique that U.S. corporations used 
to take advantage of tax deferral was setting up foreign corporations in 
countries with low taxes (tax havens) to hold passive assets.59  Congress 
initially responded to this problem by enacting the Foreign Personal Holding 
Company regime in 1937.60  This regime, which was the first step in ending 
tax deferral on foreign-held passive assets, operated by taxing U.S. owners on 
certain passive income earned by foreign corporations in the same year it was 
earned by the foreign corporation.61  The regime had major gaps because it did 
not reach foreign subsidiaries owned by publicly held U.S. companies, or 
foreign subsidiaries that earned less than 60% of their income through passive 
activities.62  It only affected a small group of foreign subsidiaries, leaving the 
previous deferral regime largely unchanged.63  Additionally, U.S. corporations 
began establishing foreign base companies, an arrangement through which a 
 
 57 Keith Engel, Tax Neutrality to the Left, International Competitiveness to the Right, Stuck in the Middle 
with Subpart F, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1525, 1527 (2001).  The reason for this is that under long-standing U.S. 
international tax policy, foreign-chartered corporations are treated as foreign persons and the distinct legal 
identity of foreign subsidiaries are honored, making foreign earnings of foreign persons non-taxable.  
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 217 (2003). 
 58 Engel, supra note 57, at 1527.  Though these earnings will eventually be taxed upon repatriation, the 
deferral benefits corporations because of the time value of money.  Id. 
 59 Id. at 1532–33.  Passive assets are stocks, bonds, and other securities held outside of the United States.  
Id.  The income produced by them was not subject to U.S. tax and only subject to a usually small tax in the 
foreign country in which they were held.  Id. at 1532. 
 60 Id. at 1533. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 1533–34. 
 63 Id.  Requirements existed prescribing that the foreign subsidiary be owned by five or fewer U.S. 
individuals, and at least 60% of the foreign subsidiary’s gross income initially had to come from certain 
passive categories.  Revenue Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-377, § 201, 50 Stat. 813, 818 (codified as amended 
at I.R.C. §§ 551–558 (2006)). 
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U.S. multinational would divert income from a high-tax jurisdiction to a low-
tax jurisdiction by making deductible payments offshore to a foreign company 
in the low-tax jurisdiction.64  Passive income could then be reinvested into 
foreign activities without triggering U.S. taxation.65 
For example, consider a U.S. multinational corporation with a U.S. 
subsidiary and a foreign subsidiary.  The U.S. subsidiary conducts operations 
in the United States that yield $700 of income.  The foreign subsidiary, which 
is located in a low-tax jurisdiction, acts as a financing entity providing loans to 
the U.S. subsidiary.  As part of the loan agreement, the U.S. subsidiary owes 
the foreign subsidiary $600 of interest.  The interest is deductible to the U.S. 
subsidiary, and the $600 is taxed at the lower rates of the foreign subsidiary’s 
country.  This transaction also reduces the U.S. multinational’s domestic tax 
obligation to $100, instead of the $700 obligation that would have existed 
without the loan arrangement.66 
Congress did not address this tax structure again until 1961, when the U.S. 
tax base began to decline and the United States was running a large deficit.67  
The Kennedy Administration proposed a virtual elimination of deferral for 
U.S.-owned foreign corporations, thereby taxing both domestic and foreign 
investments at the same rate.68  The Kennedy Administration frowned upon the 
diversion of business income through tax havens and sought to prevent 
American companies from avoiding global taxation by diverting income from 
foreign subsidiaries in countries with high tax rates to foreign countries with 
low tax rates.69  The 1961 Kennedy proposal aimed to achieve these goals by 
eliminating deferral for income earned by U.S. subsidiaries in developed 
countries, and eliminating deferral for U.S. subsidiaries operating in 
developing countries if the income was generated through profit shifting.70  
Due to the ease with which passive income could be transferred abroad and 
 
 64 William J. Gibbons, Tax Effects of Basing International Business Abroad, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1206, 
1206–08 (1955). 
 65 Id. at 1214–16.  This arrangement specifically involved a U.S. multinational owning the stock of a 
foreign subsidiary located in a tax haven (base country with a low tax rate), and the base company owning 
additional foreign subsidiaries, which operated active businesses outside of the tax haven.  Id.  The foreign 
subsidiaries would give passive income to the base company, who could reinvest this income without being 
taxed by the United States because the money was never repatriated.  Id. 
 66 Engel, supra note 57, at 1535–36. 
 67 Id. at 1538. 
 68 Id.  U.S. economic growth was also sluggish at this time, growing at approximately 2% and being 
significantly outpaced by its rivals.  Id. 
 69 Id. at 1539. 
 70 Id.  For a comparison to the transaction in the Schering-Plough case, see supra note 41. 
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allowed to grow without any U.S. taxation, the tax base would have faced 
significant decline if the deferral rules were not adjusted in some way.71 
B. The Current Subpart F Rules 
The leading congressional goal in enacting the subpart F legislation was to 
eliminate the tax-haven device that multinationals were using to accumulate 
passive income abroad.72  Most active business income was left untouched by 
subpart F, and deferral continued for these activities.73  Subpart F purported to 
end deferral on passive income by taxing income earned by controlled foreign 
corporations (CFCs) on what is known as subpart F income.74  A CFC is 
defined in I.R.C. § 957(a) as 
any foreign corporation if more than 50 percent of (1) the total 
combined voting power of all classes of stock . . . entitled to vote, 
or (2) the total value of the stock of such corporation, is 
owned . . . by United States shareholders on any day during the 
taxable year of such foreign corporation.75 
The most significant element of subpart F income is “foreign base company 
income,” which includes three major categories.76  The first of these categories 
was, and continues to be “foreign personal holding company income,”77 which 
consists of income from liquid passive assets.78  This income includes the 
 
 71 GRAETZ, supra note 57, at 219. 
 72 JOSEPH ISENBERGH, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 174 (2000).  The House Ways and Means 
Committee’s report offers four motivations behind the subpart F regime: (1) to prevent U.S. taxpayers from 
taking advantage of foreign tax systems to avoid taxation by the United States “on what could ordinarily 
expected to be U.S. income”; (2) to reach income retained abroad that was not used in the taxpayer’s trade or 
business and not invested in an underdeveloped nation; (3) to prevent the repatriation of income to the United 
States in such ways that it would not be subject to U.S. taxation; and (4) to prevent taxpayers from using 
foreign tax systems to divert sales profits from goods manufactured by related parties either in the United 
States or abroad.  H.R. REP. NO. 87-1447, at 58 (1962). 
 73 ISENBERGH, supra note 72, at 172.  Foreign base company sales income, as well as foreign base 
company services income, is active income that is covered by subpart F, but these are exceptions rather than 
the rule.  Id. at 175. 
 74 Id. at 172–73. 
 75 I.R.C. § 957(a) (2006).  Many U.S. corporations have structured their control over their foreign 
subsidiaries to avoid triggering the statutory CFC definition while still maintaining constructive control over 
the foreign subsidiary.  Regulations under § 957 have addressed this issue, making clear that formal ownership 
agreements will be set aside if the original domestic parent has actually retained a majority interest in the 
foreign subsidiary.  GRAETZ, supra note 57, at 232. 
 76 I.R.C. § 954(a).  There is an additional category of “foreign base company oil income” that is listed in 
the statute, but it is not utilized often nor is it significant for this discussion. 
 77 Id. § 954(c)(1). 
 78 Engel, supra note 57, at 1542. 
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“portion of the gross income which consists of . . . [d]ividends, interest, 
royalties, rents, and annuities,” as well as the sale or exchange of property that 
creates this form of income.79  This passive income was an easy target for 
Congress because American businesses had no reasons to defer taxation on this 
income—passive income created no competitive business concerns.80  
Eliminating deferral on these types of income removed the incentive to move 
passive income abroad, where the income was previously allowed to grow 
without being subjected to U.S. tax.81  The desired effect was to bolster the 
U.S. tax rolls without placing American businesses at a comparative 
disadvantage with their foreign competitors. 
The second major category of income covered by subpart F is “foreign base 
company sales income,” which is income arising from passing sales through a 
low-tax foreign subsidiary with no real relation to those sales.82  This income 
covers the active income from purchases and sales if the purchase or sale is 
between two related parties (usually a domestic corporation and its foreign 
subsidiary), and the purchase or sale lacks an economic nexus to the CFC’s 
country of incorporation.83  The purpose for creating this income category was 
to prevent U.S. corporations from obtaining lower tax rates on sales income by 
having subsidiaries located in low-tax jurisdictions sell products manufactured 
in a higher tax jurisdiction.84 
For example, a U.S. corporation manufactures widgets in the United States 
and then sends the widgets over to its CFC in Switzerland, which is a low-tax 
jurisdiction.  The CFC in Switzerland then sells these widgets to customers in 
Europe and Asia.  Under the pre-subpart F rules, the income from these sales 
would only be taxed under the lower Swiss rates.  Subpart F changed this rule 
to encompass the income from the sale of the widgets by the Swiss CFC.85  
 
 79 ISENBERGH, supra note 72, at 175. 
 80 Engel, supra note 57, at 1542.  This effectively evened the playing field between foreign subsidiaries 
owned by U.S. multinationals and foreign subsidiaries that were owned by closely held U.S. persons.  Foreign 
subsidiaries owned by closely held U.S. persons were already covered under the Foreign Personal Holding 
Company regime.  Id. 
 81 Id. at 1544. 
 82 See I.R.C. § 954(d)(1); ISENBERGH, supra note 72, at 176. 
 83 Engel, supra note 57, at 1544. 
 84 H.R. REP. NO. 87-1447, at 62 (1962).  If the subsidiary in a low-tax jurisdiction adds any substantial 
value to the product when it is received from the high-tax jurisdiction, then there is no foreign base company 
sales income.  Simply packaging or labeling the product, or even minor assembly, does not count as 
substantial.  Production costs (direct labor plus factory costs) must account for 20% or more of the goods sold 
to count as substantial.  Treas. Reg. § 1.954-3(a)(4)(iii) (as amended in 2008). 
 85 See Engel, supra note 57, at 1544–45. 
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However, this rule only applies if the CFC purchases from a related party, the 
CFC does not produce the property in its country, and the property is not 
ultimately going to be consumed or disposed of in the CFC’s country.86 
The final category of income initially covered by subpart F is “foreign base 
company services income,” which includes the same rules for triggering 
subpart F taxation as the foreign base company sales income.87  Income 
derived from the performance of “technical, managerial, engineering, 
architectural, scientific, skilled, industrial, commercial, or like services”88 falls 
under subpart F if the services are performed for or on behalf of a related party 
and are done outside the CFC’s country of incorporation.89 
In addition to eliminating deferral for the above classes of CFC income, 
subpart F also created deemed-dividend rules intended to prevent CFCs from 
repatriating profits back to the United States without paying subpart F 
taxation.90  These rules prevented CFCs from making loans to U.S. 
shareholders that would essentially be tax-free repatriation of income back to 
the United States.91  Any purchase by a CFC of U.S. property, U.S. corporation 
stock, or U.S. intangibles would trigger these deemed-dividend rules and thus 
be subject to subpart F taxation.92  The Schering-Plough case is a good 
example of the deemed-dividend rules.93  The district court found that the 
subsidiaries loaned Schering-Plough $690 million dollars, and Schering-
Plough owed subpart F taxation on $690 million dollars when the loan was 
made.94 
The subpart F rules have created a framework that taxes a U.S. parent 
corporation on income earned passively through a CFC, or upon repatriation of 
funds earned by the CFC.95  The deemed-dividend rules include an “obligation 
 
 86 I.R.C. § 954(d)(1). 
 87 Engel, supra note 57, at 1546.  Services must involve a related party and have no economic nexus to 
the country of incorporation to trigger subpart F income.  Id. 
 88 I.R.C. § 954(e)(1). 
 89 ISENBERGH, supra note 72, at 177.  If the services are performed in the CFC’s country of 
incorporation, then subpart F is not triggered.  Id. 
 90 Engel, supra note 57, at 1546–47. 
 91 Id. at 1547. 
 92 Id.  The deemed-dividend rules are subject to exceptions including the purchase of U.S. bonds, U.S. 
money, U.S. bank accounts, and unrelated U.S. stocks and bonds.  The purpose of these exceptions is that 
these are normal transactions and the intention is not to keep the funds in the United States indefinitely.  Id. 
 93 See Schering-Plough Corp. v. United States, 651 F. Supp. 2d 219, 222 (D.N.J. 2009). 
 94 Id. at 272. 
 95 I.R.C. §§ 951–964 (2006). 
SOLEIMANI GALLEYSFINAL 2/15/2011  2:28 PM 
2010] SUBPART F SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 517 
of a U.S. person,”96 which includes a loan made from a subsidiary to a parent.  
Loans are considered to be repatriating events, and the entire amount loaned 
from a subsidiary to a parent triggers subpart F taxation for the parent.97  If a 
subsidiary lends expensive tools to its parent, the transaction would only 
trigger subpart F to the extent of the interest the parent pays to “borrow” the 
tools from the subsidiary.98  If a parent sells an asset to a subsidiary, then this 
would not trigger subpart F taxation at all.99  The difference in the way a loan 
of money, a loan of property, and an asset sale are treated under subpart F is 
critical to the outcome in the Schering-Plough case and is revisited later in this 
Comment.100 
The American business community argued against these rules because they 
believed the system would put them at a comparative disadvantage in relation 
to their foreign rivals.101  The end result of the business community’s 
resistance to the Kennedy proposals was the enactment of the subpart F 
regime.102  The subpart F regime was a compromise between the two sides and 
reflected the different approaches that each took to international taxation.103  
The American business community favored Capital Import Neutrality, which 
preserves deferral and ensures that the business community remains 
competitive with its foreign rivals, while the Kennedy Administration favored 
Capital Export Neutrality, which eliminates deferral altogether because of the 
incentive it creates to move capital overseas.104 
 
 96 Id. § 956(c)(1)(C). 
 97 Lowell D. Yoder, Short-Term CFC Loans May Avoid Code Sec. 956, INT’L TAX J., Jan.–Feb. 2008, at 
3, 3. 
 98 See I.R.C. § 956(c)(2)(C). 
 99 Id.  This exemption can include the “stock or obligations of a domestic corporation” that is not related 
to the subsidiary.  Id. § 956(c)(2)(F). 
 100 See infra Part V.A. 
 101 See Engel, supra note 57, at 1540.  If the Kennedy reforms had passed, U.S. businesses would have 
been taxed if they continued to use tax havens, while their foreign counterparts would not.  Passing the initial 
Kennedy proposals would have made the United States the only nation to disallow deferral on tax-haven 
income, and foreign countries would still have been able to use this device without paying additional taxes to 
their domestic governments, thus placing them at a competitive advantage.  Id. 
 102 See id. at 1541.  Subpart F refers to the additional sections of the Code, §§ 951–964. 
 103 GRAETZ, supra note 57, at 225. 
 104 Id. 
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III.  THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AN INTERNATIONAL TAX SYSTEM BASED ON 
CAPITAL IMPORT NEUTRALITY AND ONE BASED ON CAPITAL EXPORT 
NEUTRALITY 
Ideally, the most efficient international tax system would eliminate the role 
that taxes play on the decisions by investors as to which countries to invest in 
or borrow from.  A fully neutral international tax system would mean that each 
country would tax its residents on their worldwide income at the same rate.105  
Therefore, nonresidents doing business in a country would not be taxed by that 
country but would instead be taxed by their country of residence at the same 
uniform rate.106  The place where the income is earned would be immaterial.107 
The current global tax regime, in which different countries have different 
rates of taxes that apply to different types of income, does not encourage the 
most efficient investment and allocation of resources.108  Companies engage in 
tax-planning strategies, which lead to investments that yield the greatest tax 
benefits and not necessarily the most efficient investment decisions.109  For 
example, when a foreign subsidiary wants to sell its widgets to a U.S.-based 
person or company, it must be conscious of the fact that it will subject its 
domestic parent to subpart F taxation.  If the foreign subsidiary sells its 
widgets to a foreign person or company, the same sale does not trigger subpart 
F taxation for the domestic parent.  Thus, the foreign subsidiary will sell the 
widgets to a foreign entity for a lower price, so long as the difference in price 
is less than the subpart F tax ramifications that a sale to a U.S. entity would 
produce.  This is an economically inefficient result that is dictated by a 
convoluted global tax system. 
Unfortunately, the idealized international tax system is unattainable 
because of the many differences that exist in countries’ methods of taxation 
and the impracticality of obtaining international cooperation for the goal of 
global welfare.110  Instead, efforts to move closer to global tax efficiency have 
 
 105 Dagan, supra note 20, at 364. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 See id. at 364–65. 
 109 See Shay, supra note 3, at 29–30. 
 110 Dagan, supra note 20, at 365.  Professor Dagan advances the argument that this cooperation is not 
feasible because countries are rational actors looking to maximize their own well-being, and the long-term 
success that a current tax policy will have on their own country is more important than the priority of global 
long-term welfare.  Id. 
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centered around two major ideas: Capital Export Neutrality and Capital Import 
Neutrality.111 
The goal of CEN is to prevent tax considerations from interfering with an 
investor’s decision on where to invest.112  The rationale of CEN is that the 
location in which an investor chooses to do business should be chosen with an 
eye toward efficiency rather than tax consequences.113  Achieving global 
efficiency would in turn lead to greater national welfare.114  CEN is achieved 
when the income tax imposed by the country in which the investor resides 
(country of residence) and the income tax imposed by the country where the 
investor does business (host country) equals the tax imposed on domestic 
investments in the country of residence.115  This formula ensures that an 
investor has the same profits from investing whether at home or abroad.116  
The achievement of CEN would occur if every country taxed only its residents 
on their worldwide income.117 
Today, most countries tax the income earned within their borders, so to 
obtain CEN a system of foreign tax credits would need to be implemented.118  
If a foreign country has a higher rate of tax than the domestic company’s 
country of residence, the income earned by the company in that foreign 
country would be subject to a higher rate of tax.119  To even out this disparity, 
the country of residence would need to provide the company with domestic tax 
credits equal to the difference between the two countries’ taxes.120 
The only way that a system of CEN could fully be achieved is if there is no 
ceiling on the amount of tax credits that the company’s country of residence is 
willing to provide.121  This would ensure that investors are only taxed at their 
country of residence’s tax rate, regardless of whether they earned income at 
 
 111 See id.; Robert J. Peroni, Deferral of U.S. Tax on International Income: End It, Don’t Mend It—Why 
Should We Be Stuck in the Middle with Subpart F?, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1609, 1609 (2001). 
 112 Dagan, supra note 20, at 367–68. 
 113 See Peroni, supra note 111, at 1613. 
 114 Dagan, supra note 20, at 367–68.  As global welfare increases as a result of this increased efficiency, 
national welfare should increase correspondingly.  Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 368.  This assumes the same before-tax return in each country.  Id. 
 117 Id.  Critics of CEN argue that this would lead to a competitive disadvantage for investors if their 
country of residence’s tax rate were higher than the domestic tax rates of their competitors.  Their competitors 
would have a significant advantage because of the lower tax rates to which they are subject.  Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at 369. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
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home or overseas.122  Take as an example a U.S. multinational that has an 
Italian subsidiary and the Italian subsidiary earns income from the Italian 
market.  If Italy has a 35% corporate tax rate and the United States has a 25% 
corporate tax rate, then if the Italian subsidiary earns $1,000,000 of income in 
Italy, it will pay $350,000 in taxes to Italy.  The Italian subsidiary would have 
only paid $250,000 in taxes based on the U.S. corporate rate.  So to 
compensate for this disparity and to ensure that tax consequences are not 
dictating where business is being done, the United States would need to 
provide $100,000 in tax credits to the U.S. multinational to reduce its overall 
tax burden. 
CIN, on the other hand, is predicated on the fact that the total tax on the 
investment returns in a country should be the same, regardless of the investor’s 
country of residence.123  Any business operating in a country would be subject 
to the same rate of taxation.124  Without CIN, countries with low tax rates are 
able to attract more investment than countries with high tax rates, even when 
such investment would be otherwise less efficient.125 
CIN could be reached if all countries had an identical rate of taxation on all 
income produced within their borders, regardless of investors’ residency status, 
and if countries exempted residents from tax on the income that they produced 
abroad.126  For example, if a U.S. multinational has a foreign subsidiary 
located in a low-tax jurisdiction, its income would be subject to the low rate 
and, at least initially, would avoid U.S. rates of taxation.  Once the income has 
repatriated, it would be subject to U.S. taxation.  This affords the multinational 
deferral on the income earned by the subsidiary and provides an incentive to 
have passive income held in low-tax jurisdictions to reduce the multinational’s 
tax liability.  By adopting CIN, a country allows its resident investors to 
compete more effectively with foreign competitors because earned foreign 
income is only subject to foreign countries’ tax rates and not to any additional 
domestic tax.127 
 
 122 Id. at 368–69.  For true CEN to be achieved, there should be no maximum amount of foreign tax 
credits given to an investor.  If the foreign tax rate is higher, then the country of residence should subsidize the 
difference in taxes to ensure that the total level of taxes equals the level in the country of residence.  Id. at 369. 
 123 Id. at 370. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. at 371.  This serves as a prime example of taxes driving investment strategy rather than the most 
efficient investment option. 
 126 Id. 
 127 See id.  Commentators have criticized CIN because it provides an incentive for investors to move 
investments to countries with low tax rates.  Thus, tax considerations are a major factor for investors deciding 
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IV.  DIFFICULTIES AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE CURRENT SUBPART F 
SYSTEM 
It is difficult to create a complex and nuanced international tax system that 
balances a careful compromise between global tax neutrality and keeping 
American businesses competitive with their rivals.  Essentially, subpart F tries 
to strike this balance by distinguishing the good deferral of active business 
income, which keeps American companies competitive abroad, from the bad 
deferral of passive income from tax havens.128 
Subpart F’s approach to striking this balance was to establish a series of 
detailed rules to separate the good deferral from the bad.129  When rigid 
objective rules are used to solve such a complex and detailed problem, strong 
incentives are created for corporations to use tax-planning strategies that 
structure transactions to avoid the anti-deferral rules.130  Section A describes 
one of the biggest loopholes in the current subpart F system: hybrid entities.  
Section B then explains the competing policies on international taxation that 
are guiding proponents on each side of the debate. 
A. The Debate over the Treatment of Hybrid Entities Under Subpart F 
Major issues with subpart F are highlighted by the ongoing dispute over 
how subpart F should treat hybrid branches that arose after the check-the-box 
regulations issued by the Treasury Department in 1996.131  These regulations 
allow a foreign entity to qualify as a corporation for foreign tax purposes and a 
branch for U.S. tax purposes.132  The hybrid branch structure involves three 
different entities, all of which are owned by a U.S. corporation: (1) a foreign 
holding company, (2) a foreign active company, and (3) a foreign hybrid 
 
where to locate their investments because they may receive an economic return lower than what they would 
receive in their home country—as long as the tax reduction makes the investment worthwhile.  Peroni, supra 
note 111, at 1613–14. 
 128 GRAETZ, supra note 57, at 226. 
 129 Id. 
 130 An example of this is the convoluted transaction that Schering-Plough entered into with ABN to sell 
future income from notional principal contracts to its foreign subsidiary in exchange for a lump sum cash 
payment.  See Complaint, supra note 34, at 3.  This transaction technically followed the letter of Notice 89-21 
and, according to the letter of the law, should have been exempt from subpart F taxation.  Schering-Plough 
paid Merrill Lynch millions of dollars to plan this tax strategy to comply with the complicated objective Code 
regulations, while still accomplishing its desired result of repatriating income without it being subject to 
subpart F taxation. 
 131 See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(a), 301.7701-3(a) (1996); Engel, supra note 57, at 1552. 
 132 Engel, supra note 57, at 1552.  Branch status generally makes the foreign entity disregarded for U.S. 
tax purposes.  Id. 
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entity.133  The first two companies are located in the same high-tax-rate 
country while the foreign holding company forms the hybrid entity in a tax-
haven country.134  A debtor–creditor relationship is then established with the 
foreign holding company paying interest to the hybrid branch.135  This 
structure allows interest payments that are sent to the hybrid to avoid subpart F 
taxation because the hybrid branch is not recognized for U.S. tax purposes and 
the payment is a direct payment from a foreign holding company and active 
company in the same country.136 
An example of how this would work would be if the foreign holding 
company and active company are each located in the high-tax jurisdiction of 
Germany and the holding company that creates the hybrid entity is located in 
the low-tax jurisdiction of Switzerland.  Each of the three companies is owned 
by a U.S. company.  The active company in Germany has earned $500 of 
income from its business.  The hybrid entity enters into a loan agreement with 
the active company, under which the active company must pay $500 in interest 
to the hybrid.  The interest payment to the hybrid shifts the $500 of income 
earned by the active company to Switzerland.  The United States would look at 
the interest payment as moving from the active company to the holding 
company (which set up the hybrid) in Germany, because the hybrid entity is 
disregarded as a branch.  This would avoid subpart F taxation because the 
active and holding companies are both located in Germany and they are related 
parties.137 
In 1998, the IRS proposed anti-hybrid regulations aimed at stopping this 
practice by recognizing the hybrid branch for U.S. tax purposes.138  These 
regulations faced strong challenges from those who argued that this hybrid 
system merely avoided foreign tax and was outside the intended scope of 
subpart F.139  Critics also argued that the hybrid structure was a necessary 
mechanism that allowed U.S. companies to compete on a level playing field 
 
 133 Id. at 1553. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id.  This type of transaction avoids subpart F taxation because of the same-country exception for sales 
to related parties with regard to foreign personal holding company income.  Id. 
 137 See id. at 1553–54. 
 138 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.954-9T(a)(4), 63 Fed. Reg. 14,669, 14,673 (Mar. 26, 1998).  Under the proposed 
regulations, the hybrid branch would be treated as a corporation for subpart F purposes, and the interest 
payments the hybrid received would be subpart F income because they fall outside the same country exception.  
See id. 
 139 Engel, supra note 57, at 1554. 
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with foreign competitors who were able to exploit this tax-haven structure.140  
Without the hybrid structure, U.S. businesses would be subject to higher rates 
of taxation than their foreign competitors that were still able to utilize 
hybrids.141  Referring back to the above example, the German active company 
would now have the $500 of income subject to subpart F taxation, while 
foreign multinationals would still be able to use the hybrid structure to keep the 
$500 safe from domestic taxes.  This difference would place U.S. companies at 
a comparative disadvantage.  This concern was not shared by the IRS, who 
argued that subpart F was created to prevent companies from avoiding a 
worldwide tax.142 
The debate over the anti-hybrid regulations pitted the same parties against 
one another as in the initial debate regarding subpart F.143  The disagreement 
was still over what the preferred policy behind international taxation should be: 
CEN or CIN.144  The anti-hybrid regulation debate proved how far the 
Treasury Department was willing to go to support the policy of CEN, even 
when the U.S. tax base was not immediately threatened.145  The Treasury 
Department reiterated that CEN was its guiding principle in international 
taxation when it released a report on the current effectiveness of subpart F in 
2000.146  In the report, the Treasury Department expressed its clear preference 
for CEN and advocated a position that would reduce deferral greatly.147 
B. Proposed Academic Solutions to Subpart F 
1. Benefits and Drawbacks of Implementing Uncontrolled CEN 
There are those who would take the Treasury Department’s proposals even 
further, by outright eliminating all deferral on earnings from foreign 
 
 140 Id. at 1555. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 See id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 See OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE DEFERRAL OF INCOME EARNED 
THROUGH U.S. CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS: A POLICY STUDY 23–54 (2000) (stating that capital 
export neutrality is likely the best policy for promoting economic welfare). 
 147 See id. at 23–54, 83 (arguing that an anti-deferral regime is necessary to prevent the use of tax-
avoidance techniques).  The only recognition that the Treasury Department gives to the goal of simplicity in 
the tax system is the concept that getting rid of deferral would be easier than the current system.  Id. at 84. 
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subsidiaries.148  Robert J. Peroni, a professor at the University of Texas School 
of Law, argues that the deferral principle, which allows U.S. parent companies 
to avoid taxation from most foreign subsidiary active income until repatriation, 
undercuts fairness in the tax system and encourages U.S. companies to shift 
income to low-tax overseas jurisdictions.149  He argues that the complicated 
subpart F system that exists today makes deferral elective for a well-advised 
taxpayer and points to the check-the-box hybrid system as proof.150  He 
concludes from this information that deferral should be completely eliminated 
for CFC income.151  Professor Peroni discounts the idea that the repeal of 
deferral would reduce American competitiveness abroad because if firms face 
the same tax rate in any location in which they operate, then “their pretax 
return on their marginal investment will be equal.”152 
The American business community thoroughly disagrees with both the 
reduction and elimination of the current system of deferral.153  U.S. 
multinationals issued a report which compared the subpart F rules that are 
applied to U.S. corporations with other countries’ systems of international 
taxation.154  The report shows that, in nearly every respect, the CFC regimes of 
other similarly situated countries are less strict than that of the United States.155  
As U.S. companies have continued to focus on foreign markets to remain 
competitive in this global economy, and as income from foreign subsidiaries 
has increased at a faster rate than domestic sales, the more stringent subpart F 
rules place American businesses on unequal footing with their foreign 
 
 148 See Robert J. Peroni, Back to the Future: A Path to Progressive Reform of the U.S. International 
Income Tax Rules, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 975, 988 (1997). 
 149 Id. at 986–87. 
 150 Id. at 987–88. 
 151 Id. at 988. 
 152 Id. at 988–99.  The argument is that pretax return is the true measure of productivity of capital and that 
regardless of what foreign competitors are doing, it is more efficient for U.S. firms to move capital back into 
the United States if they are earning a lower rate of pretax return in the low-tax foreign country.  Id. at 989. 
 153 See NAT’L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, THE NFTC FOREIGN INCOME PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL TAX 
POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 46 (2001) (stating that U.S. trade and business interests believed that the 
abolition of deferral would erode the competitive position of U.S. companies abroad). 
 154 See id. at 67–92.  The countries used for comparison were Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.  Id. at 67. 
 155 See id. at 67–92.  The report indicates that the foreign countries’ regimes were all adopted after subpart 
F and therefore reflected a study of the impact of subpart F as well as ways to refine the system.  Id. at 68.  The 
United States is the only country that currently taxes active financial-services income from both related and 
unrelated parties.  Id. at 89 tbl.4–1a.  The United States is also the only major country to tax active business 
royalty payments from a subsidiary in another country.  Id. at 90 tbl.4–1b. 
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competitors.156  The report urges that adoption of CEN is unwise because of 
the increased global competition that U.S. multinationals face, and the fact that 
no other country has adopted an international taxation system consistent with 
CEN.157  The business community argues that moving international tax policy 
toward CIN, by limiting the scope of subpart F to include only passive income, 
would simplify U.S. tax rules and would be more in line with those of foreign 
companies.158 
2. Benefits and Drawbacks of Implementing Uncontrolled CIN 
On the other hand, David Rosenbloom, a professor at New York University 
School of Law, suggests that keeping American multinationals competitive 
should be the guiding principle behind any subpart F reform.159  He finds fault 
with taxing domestic base company income while most foreign base company 
income is not covered by subpart F.160  He argues that in a globalized world, it 
should not matter where the income is earned, and that, when a U.S. company 
buys from or sells to a related party and the good’s manufacture or its sale 
occurs in the United States, that income should be exempt from taxation.161  He 
states that it is “competitiveness on which any ‘reform’ of subpart F must rest,” 
and, because other countries allow their multinationals to place income into 
low-tax jurisdictions without taxing the income, the United States should also 
do this to keep its companies competitive.162 
By exempting income made by foreign base companies abroad as well as 
domestic base income earned in the United States, American business would 
be more competitive globally, and there would be an increased incentive for 
companies to invest domestically.163  For example, if the United States affords 
a multinational deferral on a portion of its income that is assigned a specific 
economic function earned in Malaysia, then that same income assigned the 
 
 156 Id. at 97.  This competitive imbalance hurts business more than in the 1960s because of the 
increasingly globalized market and percentage of business sales that come from foreign subsidiaries.  See id. at 
95. 
 157 Id. at 126–27. 
 158 Id. at 127. 
 159 H. David Rosenbloom, Thinking About Subpart F: The Domestic Base Company, TAXES, Mar. 2004, 
at 153, 155. 
 160 Id.  This income is taxed if the sale involves a related party and lacks an economic nexus to the CFC’s 
country of incorporation.  I.R.C. § 954(d)(1) (2006). 
 161 Rosenbloom, supra note 159, at 155–56.  Rosenbloom acknowledges that this system would be the 
equivalent of an across-the-board corporate tax cut.  Id. at 155. 
 162 Id. at 155–56. 
 163 Id. at 156. 
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same economic function in the United States should also get deferral.164  The 
income is earned in the same fashion, so it should not matter whether the 
income is earned at home or abroad.165 
The problem with this proposal is that it encourages U.S. businesses to earn 
income abroad in countries with low tax rates.  Income would be earned 
abroad in the country with the lowest possible tax rate and then sent back to the 
United States with no tax consequences.  This proposal would reduce the 
amount of money that the government receives in taxes and would encourage 
U.S. companies to move operations abroad, theoretically cutting American 
workforces. 
A second proposal would wholly eliminate U.S. tax upon repatriation.166  
This proposal would remove any U.S. tax motivation for leaving deferred 
income overseas167 and would essentially function as a tax exemption on CFC 
income that is not covered by subpart F.168  This proposal trusts that the tax 
CFCs face in their home countries is sufficient, and no additional U.S. tax 
upon repatriation is required.169  As a result of the proposal, U.S. 
multinationals would structure their transactions so that CFCs in countries with 
low tax rates generate as much taxable income as possible.  After the income is 
taxed in the low-tax jurisdiction, the U.S. multinational would have a strong 
incentive to transfer this money back to the United States.170 
As the goal of global tax neutrality becomes more viable, this system will 
become increasingly feasible since foreign tax rates will be an effective 
substitute for the existing U.S. tax system.171  Additionally, the United States 
collects less than one billion dollars a year on nonpassive subpart F income,172 
so the ramifications for adopting a proposal like this would not greatly affect 
 
 164 See id. at 154 (arguing that there is no reason for U.S. policymakers to favor foreign activities over 
U.S. activities). 
 165 Id. 
 166 Engel, supra note 57, at 1603. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id.  Foreign base company sales and service income rules are forms of active income for which the 
policy would provide tax exemption.  I.R.C. § 954(d)(1), (e)(1) (2006). 
 169 Engel, supra note 57, at 1603. 
 170 Id.  Under this proposed system, there is no need for U.S. multinationals to keep non-subpart F income 
in low-tax jurisdictions to gain the benefit of deferral.  Id.  Therefore, as soon as income earned by foreign 
subsidiaries is needed by the domestic parent, it is sent back to the United States.  See id.  This system would 
make the issue in the Schering-Plough case moot because Schering-Plough would have been able to get the 
money from its foreign subsidiaries without structuring a complicated and expensive arrangement. 
 171 Rosenbloom, supra note 159, at 153. 
 172 Id. 
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the amount of taxable income that the government receives, while the benefits 
of increased investment in the United States could be significant.173 
This proposal is severely limited by the incongruities between the current 
U.S. tax system and one based on global tax neutrality.  It is also unlikely that 
foreign tax rates will ever be an effective substitute for domestic rates because 
there is an incentive for foreign countries to lower their tax rates in an effort to 
attract foreign capital into their country.174  Thus, wholly eliminating the tax on 
repatriation would encourage American businesses to earn as much money as 
they could abroad in the country with the lowest tax rate, and foreign countries 
to compete for the lowest tax rate in an effort to attract capital. 
V. POSSIBLE REMEDIES TO THE ARBITRARY CLASSIFICATION OF ASSETS BY 
THE COURT IN THE SCHERING-PLOUGH DECISION 
Under current subpart F rules, the proceeds of a loan from a CFC to a 
parent company are taxable to the parent immediately upon receipt of the 
funds.175  The reason for this is that a loan from subsidiary to parent is 
considered a constructive dividend and thus a repatriating event.176 
The congressional purpose for taxing these loans was to capture income 
that would otherwise not be taxable under subpart F, because a loan from a 
domestic to parent is effectively repatriation of income from a subsidiary to a 
parent.177  Section A of this Part analyzes the difficulty in determining whether 
the transaction engaged in by Schering-Plough was an assignment of future 
income or a loan.  Section B determines whether CIN or CEN would prove 
more effective in eliminating different taxation for economically equivalent 
transactions. 
 
 173 Adoption of this proposal would also save companies a great deal in avoiding tax-planning strategies 
to repatriate income and avoid taxation. 
 174 See Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert, The Three Parties in the Race to the Bottom: Host 
Governments, Home Governments and Multinational Companies, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 153, 167 (2005) 
(suggesting that high-tax host countries have reacted to increasing tax sensitivity in investment by easing 
transfer pricing and thin capitalization rules to attract foreign capital).  This phenomenon of foreign countries 
attempting to have the lowest tax rate in an effort to gain foreign investment is often referred to as a “race to 
the bottom.”  NAT’L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, supra note 153, at 67–68. 
 175 I.R.C. § 956(c)(1)(C) (2006). 
 176 E.g., id.; Yoder, supra note 97, at 3. 
 177 H.R. REP. NO. 87-1447, at 58 (1962). 
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A. The Schering-Plough Transaction: Was It a Sale or a Loan? Why We Need 
a Better Way to Tell the Difference 
Subpart F taxes U.S. shareholders on the amount of “United States property 
held (directly or indirectly) by the controlled foreign corporation,”178 and 
defines U.S. property, in part, as “an obligation of a United States person.”179  
The regulations define an obligation as “any bond, note, debenture . . . whether 
or not issued at a discount and whether or not bearing interest . . .”180  U.S. 
property does not include the purchase by a CFC of stock or debt obligations 
from unrelated domestic corporations.181 
It follows from these provisions that the sale of an unrelated domestic 
company’s asset from a parent to a CFC would be taxed in the way that most 
asset sales are taxed—amount realized minus adjusted basis182—and would not 
be included as subpart F income.  This analysis shows that a loan from a CFC 
to a parent would be taxable under subpart F, while the sale of an asset would 
not be.183  When a CFC makes a loan to a parent, it is assumed that the money 
from the loan will not be paid back.184  Therefore, the loan is treated as a 
repatriating event, and the entire sum of the loan is immediately taxable to the 
parent under subpart F.185  On the other hand, the sale of an asset from a parent 
to a CFC is not covered under subpart F,186 presumably because the sale price 
the CFC is paying for the asset is fair.  If a parent takes out a legitimate loan 
from its CFC that it intends to pay back, then why are these transfer pricing 
rules insufficient to police the legitimacy of loans as well as sales? 
 
 178 I.R.C. § 956(a)(1)(A). 
 179 Id. § 956(c)(1)(C).  These deemed-dividend rules also include the selling of parent company stock to a 
CFC.  Id. § 956(c)(1)(B). 
 180 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.956-2T(d)(2) (as amended in 2008). 
 181 E.g., I.R.C. § 956(c)(2)(F); Lowell D. Yoder & Sandra P. McGill, Treatment of CFC Loans to U.S. 
Affiliates: The Sword and Sickle of Subpart F, 26 TAX MGM’T INT’L J. 454, 457 (1997).  Originally, under 
§ 956, a loan from a CFC to a parent, whose term was less than a year, did not trigger the deemed-dividend 
rules.  Id. at 459.  Regulations in 1993 changed the rule so that the loan would trigger subpart F if not paid in 
three months.  Id. at 468. 
 182 See I.R.C. § 1001(a). 
 183 Compare id. § 956(c)(1)(C) (stating that an obligation of a U.S. person is taxable under subpart F), 
with id. § 956(c)(2)(C) (stating that the stock or debt obligations of a domestic corporation that is neither a 
U.S. shareholder of a CFC, nor a domestic corporation, is exempt from subpart F taxation). 
 184 Kimberly S. Blanchard, Guidance Needed for CFC Lending Transactions, 126 TAX NOTES 201, 205 
(2010). 
 185 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 956(c)(1)(C); Yoder, supra note 97, at 3. 
 186 See I.R.C. § 482.  These sales between parent and CFC are governed by the transfer pricing rules under 
§ 482 of the Code.  See id. 
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The arbitrary distinction between a loan and a sale renders the Schering-
Plough opinion disconcerting.  The difference between the assignment of 
future income streams that Schering-Plough sought to participate in with its 
CFC, and the loan that the court found the transaction to be, is a factual 
determination. 
Given the failure of the Schering-Plough court to announce which elements 
it considered essential to the distinction between a sale and loan, how are 
courts to draw the line in the future?  The court did not articulate a balancing 
test or the factor that made this transaction a loan, but instead relied heavily on 
the amorphous substance-over-form doctrine.187  In substance, there is little 
difference between the gain realized from an asset and interest paid on a loan, 
yet one transaction is taxed at a higher rate under subpart F.  Both transactions 
need to be policed, but currently asset sales are policed using the transfer 
pricing rules, while loans are presumed to be unfair transactions and deemed 
repatriating events when they occur, even if the loan is legitimate. 
The difficult and subjective analysis in which a court must engage to 
determine which of several economically identical transactions a company has 
entered suggests a need for clearer and more objective rules that give 
meaningful distinction between transactions that are to be taxed differently.  
Additionally, it is important to give taxpayers predictability and stability in the 
law.  Schering-Plough relied on Revenue Notice 89-21, which was the 
governing principle on notional principal contracts at the time of the 
transaction, yet still lost the case.188  This further suggests that the arbitrary 
distinctions that still exist with regard to which transactions fall under subpart 
F need to be made clearer and more meaningful.  The goal of a tax system 
should not be to encourage a company to engage in expensive tax-planning 
strategies.189  Nor should it force companies to synthetically create a 
transaction wholly for tax purposes that is economically identical to the 
transaction it would have otherwise engaged in had it not been for the 
unnecessary distinction created by the law. 
 
 187 Schering-Plough Corp. v. United States, 651 F. Supp. 2d 219, 246 (D.N.J. 2009). 
 188 Id. at 222, 272. 
 189 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al., Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a 
Formulary Profit Split, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 497, 498–515 (2009) (discussing the reward for aggressive tax 
planning and proposing a formulary apportionment tax system which would tax U.S. multinational 
corporations on a fraction of their worldwide incomes). 
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B. Using Theories of Global Taxation to Remedy the Arbitrary 
Categorizations of Income Taxed by Subpart F 
If a major goal of international tax policy should be to treat economically 
identical transactions in a consistent manner, then the United States needs an 
overarching theoretical policy to reach this result.  In thinking about better 
alternatives to having a court make the difficult decision of categorizing a 
transaction as a sale or loan, it is useful to refer back to the discussion of CIN 
and CEN.190  A CEN system would lessen the problem of categorizing a 
specific asset for tax purposes because, wherever a taxpayer chooses to do 
business, it would be theoretically taxed at the same rate.191 
A business would have no incentive to construct a transaction to elude the 
complicated repatriation rules if its earnings abroad were taxed at the same rate 
as its domestic earnings.  There would, in fact, be no need for the subpart F 
rules regarding repatriation because the incentive to earn income in low-tax 
jurisdictions would no longer exist, and taxpayers would engage in tax-
planning strategies less frequently.  The CEN approach would lead taxpayers 
toward the most efficient forms of investment rather than those that would 
produce the most tax savings, as well as provide taxpayers with a simple and 
predictable administrative framework on how their investments would be 
taxed.192  Moving toward CEN would also increase domestic investment by 
eliminating any tax advantage from investing abroad.193 
Moving toward CEN would also reduce the vigorous debate over the 
treatment of hybrid entities under subpart F to merely an academic 
distinction.194  By having all of a company’s earnings taxed at the same rate 
abroad as they are taxed domestically, the complicated hybrid entity 
transactions designed to exploit lower tax rates in foreign countries would no 
longer yield any benefit to American companies.  The elimination of the 
hybrid-entity loophole, by moving closer to an international tax system based 
on CEN, would greatly reduce expensive and complicated tax-planning 
strategies in which U.S. corporations engage. 
CIN would be less helpful in ending the difficult types of asset distinction 
that occurred in Schering-Plough.  By subjecting companies only to foreign tax 
 
 190 See supra notes 105–27 and accompanying text. 
 191 See supra text accompanying notes 115–16. 
 192 See supra text accompanying notes 113–16. 
 193 Peroni, supra note 113, at 1613. 
 194 See supra notes 131–47 and accompanying text. 
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rates, CIN would continue to create an incentive for businesses to earn a 
significant amount of their income in countries with low tax rates.195  The 
policy of CIN would also strengthen the need for the subpart F repatriation 
laws because companies would continue to attempt to avoid U.S. taxation on 
the income that they earn in the low-tax jurisdictions. 
The transaction that Schering-Plough entered would not be changed by this 
rule.  Loopholes in the tax system would continue to be exploited, and tax-
planning strategies would continue to be routinely utilized.  The hybrid branch 
debate would continue as American companies would inevitably seek the 
foreign country with the lowest tax rate to gain the greatest possible tax 
advantage.  Although countries have varying tax rates and CIN is a useful tool 
to keep American businesses competitive with foreign competitors who could 
be taxed at a lower rate abroad,196 this policy does not move the United States 
any closer to treating economically identical transactions the same.  It does not 
solve the difficult distinction between loans and asset sales that the court faced 
in categorizing the transaction in Schering-Plough. 
VI.  PROPOSED CHANGES TO SUBPART F: TAXING ECONOMICALLY IDENTICAL 
TRANSACTIONS THE SAME 
In analyzing the Schering-Plough transaction on a microeconomic level, it 
is helpful to refer back to the way in which loans and asset sales are treated 
under subpart F.197  When a foreign subsidiary lends money to a domestic 
parent, this is deemed a repatriating event and requires no further investigation 
of the transaction’s fairness.198  This tax treatment of a cash loan is different 
from the treatment of a loan of property from a foreign subsidiary to a 
domestic parent.199  A loan of property—chair-making equipment, for 
example—is not deemed a repatriating event for the domestic parent, and 
subpart F is only triggered to the extent of the interest that the domestic parent 
pays to its subsidiary to loan the chairs.200  When a domestic parent sells an 
 
 195 See supra note 127. 
 196 Most foreign countries’ policies on repatriation are more lenient than that of the United States.  See 
supra note 155. 
 197 See supra note 92. 
 198 See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
 199 Compare I.R.C. § 956(c)(1)(C) (2006) (stating that an obligation of a U.S. person is taxable under 
subpart F), with id. § 956(c)(2)(C) (stating that an obligation arising from the sale or processing of property is 
exempt from subpart F taxation). 
 200 Id. § 956(c)(2)(C). 
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asset to its foreign subsidiary, the transaction is not deemed a repatriation and 
does not trigger subpart F at all.201 
Subpart F draws a distinction among the loaning of money, the loaning of 
the chair-making equipment, and the sale of an asset between a subsidiary and 
parent.  For example, if a domestic parent loans chair-making equipment from 
its foreign subsidiary and then sells the equipment for a large profit to a third 
party, this may not trigger subpart F taxation to the parent.202  But if cash loans 
between parent and subsidiary are repatriating events because of the difficulty 
in policing repayment to a subsidiary, then why is there not the same concern 
that chairs loaned to the parent company will not be given back to the 
subsidiary or that the sale price a subsidiary pays for an asset is too low?  
Subpart F draws a distinction where no distinction should exist.  The fact that 
there is an artificial line distinguishing the tax treatment of these three 
transactions is not sound tax policy and allows for manipulation. 
A. First Proposal 
Transfer pricing rules should be used to police loans between a parent and 
its subsidiary.  Under current tax law, when a parent sells an asset to a 
subsidiary, it is not taxed under subpart F but instead is policed by the transfer 
pricing rules in the Code.203  If the transfer pricing rules are effective in 
policing the asset sales between parent and subsidiary, then these same rules 
should be used to police loans between parent and subsidiary.  Rather than 
automatically categorizing cash loans between parent and subsidiary as 
repatriating events, transfer pricing rules should be used to analyze the 
legitimacy of the loan. 
If the loan is, in fact, a true loan and there is no actual value transfer, then 
the loan should be treated consistently with asset sales.  For example, if a 
foreign subsidiary loans its domestic parent $300 million, the transfer pricing 
rules should be used to determine whether the loan is actually a loan that the 
parent will repay.  If it is deemed to be a loan, then the only amount that would 
trigger subpart F income to the parent would be the interest payments made to 
 
 201 This asset sale is governed by § 1001(a) and subject to the complicated transfer pricing rules in § 482.  
See id. §§ 482, 1001(c). 
 202 Complicated and conflicting regulations exist when property is loaned from subsidiary to parent 
including the “guarantee” and “asset pledge” rules.  See Blanchard, supra note 184, at 202–04 (describing the 
complicated regulations involved when assets from a foreign subsidiary are used as collateral for a domestic 
parent’s debt obligation). 
 203 See I.R.C. § 482. 
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the subsidiary.  The amount of interest is the amount that the parent pays to 
rent the money from its subsidiary and is the only amount of actual value that 
is being transferred.  Therefore, that amount should be subject to subpart F 
taxation when it is made. 
Transfer pricing rules could also be used to police property loans between 
subsidiary and parent, thereby eliminating the need for the confusing 
regulations that exist to determine when a parent would have subpart F income 
from these loans.  Attempting to determine whether the agreed-to sale price of 
an asset between a subsidiary and its parent is fair is a more difficult task than 
determining whether a loan between a subsidiary and its parent should be 
respected. 
For example, if a subsidiary sells equipment to its parent, it is a difficult 
task to determine whether the parent paid the equipment’s fair market value, 
especially if the parent resold the equipment a year later for a profit.204  If the 
transaction is, in fact, deemed to be a legitimate loan under the transfer pricing 
rules, then the only amount that should be subject to subpart F taxation is the 
interest that the parent owes the subsidiary on the loan.205  Applying the 
transfer pricing rules to these three types of transactions between subsidiary 
and parent would go a long way in ensuring consistent tax treatment for these 
transactions, and it would eliminate disputes like the one that occurred in 
Schering-Plough.206 
B. Second Proposal 
Alternatively, if the transfer pricing rules are deemed to be ineffective in 
determining whether an asset sale between subsidiary and parent is legitimate, 
then subpart F must be amended to encompass these asset sales.207  In this 
circumstance, asset sales and property loans between parent and subsidiary 
should be treated in the same way that cash loans are currently treated.208  All 
three transactions should automatically be considered repatriating events, and 
 
 204 This transaction would be governed by the transfer pricing rules in § 482.  See id. 
 205 This is the way that property loans are currently taxed under subpart F.  See id. § 956(c)(1)(C). 
 206 If the transaction that Schering-Plough entered into with its foreign subsidiaries was governed by the 
transfer pricing rules, then there would be no need to engage in a substance-over-form analysis or attempt to 
categorize the transaction.  All that would be necessary would be a determination on whether the agreement 
was fair under the transfer pricing rules. 
 207 Section 956(c) of the Code could broaden the definition of U.S. property to include any type of loan 
between subsidiary and parent, as well as asset sales between subsidiary and parent. 
 208 Id. § 956(c)(1)(C). 
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subpart F should immediately be triggered.  This approach provides the added 
benefit of bypassing complicated inquiries into the validity of a given 
transaction.209 
For example, if a domestic parent sold its foreign subsidiary stock of an 
unrelated U.S. company, the entire amount of the transaction would 
immediately subject the parent to subpart F taxation.210  There would be no 
need to examine the transfer pricing rules to analyze the transaction.  This 
immediate invocation of subpart F for transactions between a subsidiary and 
parent would prevent courts from undertaking the difficult factual inquiry in 
Schering-Plough because the difficulties in policing transactions between 
subsidiary and parent would necessitate that they are always repatriating 
events.211  Multinational taxpayers would have clear guidance on what the law 
is and would no longer need to enter into expensive tax-planning strategies in 
dealings with their subsidiaries because they would be taxed under subpart F, 
no matter how the transaction is structured.212 
CONCLUSION 
The Schering-Plough opinion illustrates the difficulties with courts 
categorizing complex financial transactions for the purposes of subpart F.  
These categories can mean a difference of hundreds of millions of dollars in 
tax liability and encourage companies to engage in expensive tax-planning 
strategies to structure economically identical transactions in a way that avoids 
subpart F taxation.  To resolve these issues and inconsistencies, the subpart F 
rules must be more consistent and predictable, treating like transactions alike 
and discouraging the artificial construction of transactions simply for the 
purpose of avoiding taxation.  By moving toward an international tax system  
 
 
 209 The entire substance-over-form analysis used by the Schering-Plough court would be unnecessary.  
See supra note 42. 
 210 Under the current rules, this transaction would be governed by the transfer pricing rules of § 482.  If 
the domestic parent sold the subsidiary stock of itself, this would trigger subpart F taxation under 
§ 956(c)(1)(B). 
 211 As such, dealings between a parent and its subsidiaries will be governed by § 956(a)(1)(A). 
 212 See supra note 189. 
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based on CEN and treating identical transactions the same by using one of the 
two proposals presented, the United States can move closer to a tax system in 
which efficiency is the driving force behind investment decisions. 
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